The Finance–Growth Link Revisited and the Role of Institutions as a Source of Finance in Latin America by Blanco, Luisa
Pepperdine University
Pepperdine Digital Commons
School of Public Policy Working Papers School of Public Policy
10-26-2011
The Finance–Growth Link Revisited and the Role
of Institutions as a Source of Finance in Latin
America
Luisa Blanco
Pepperdine University, luisa.blancoraynal@pepperdine.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in School of Public Policy Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Blanco, Luisa, "The Finance–Growth Link Revisited and the Role of Institutions as a Source of Finance in Latin America" (2011).
Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy Working Papers. Paper 32.
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers/32
 
 
0 
 
The Finance–Growth Link Revisited and the Role of Institutions  
as a Source of Finance in Latin America 
 
Luisa Blanco* 
School of Public Policy 
Pepperdine University 
lblanco@pepperdine.edu 
 
 
Abstract 
In a panel framework that includes 18 countries, this paper studies the short and long run 
effect of financial development on economic growth and the determinants of financial 
development in Latin America. Financial development shows a positive effect on economic 
growth in the long run, but a negative effect in the short run for the full sample. When the 
sample is divided by income levels, this result holds only for the high income group. For 
the low income group, financial development has no significant effect on economic growth 
in the short run or in the long run. In the analysis of the determinants of financial 
development in Latin America, greater financial openness and lower country risk are 
associated with higher levels of financial development. From the components of the 
country risk index (financial, economic, and political risk) only the political risk index 
comes up positively significant. From the components of the political risk index, only law 
and order and government stability have a positive significant effect on financial 
development.  
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I. Introduction 
The improvement of financial markets in Latin American countries in the last two 
decades is prominent and well known. Private credit as share of GDP for the Latin 
American region went from 17 percent in the period 1970-1974, to 31 percent in the period 
2005-2008 (period average).
1
 The significant development of the financial sector in Latin 
America has led to an increasing interest on studying the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in this region.  
While there is a vast amount of work on the finance-growth link, there is no 
consensus on the impact of financial development on economic growth. While, several 
theoretical and empirical analyses show that financial development leads to economic 
growth, some provide evidence that financial development has no significant effect on 
economic growth. Others argue that the effect is dependent on certain conditions, and that 
financial development might have a negative effect in some cases. Thus, the study of the 
finance-growth link continues to be a topic of interest. There has also been an increasing 
interest on studying what factors explain financial development. 
This paper studies the impact of financial development on economic growth in the 
short and long run and the determinants of financial development in Latin America. This 
analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it expands on Loayza’s and 
Ranciere (2006) study of the impact of financial development on economic growth by 
focusing only on the Latin American region and expanding the sample period. Second, 
along the work of Rioja and Valev (2004a), this analysis studies the long and short term 
effect of financial development on economic growth across different income groups. Third, 
in relation of the study of the determinants of financial development, this paper expands on 
                                                            
1 Author’s calculation with the data used in this analysis. 
 
 
2 
 
Chin’s and Ito (2006) and Baltagi’s et al. (2009) work by focusing on Latin American 
countries, expanding the sample period, and considering other factors related to institutions 
and country stability as possible determinants of financial development.  
This paper answers the following questions for the Latin American region: 1) What 
is the effect of financial development on economic growth at different time frames and 
across countries with different income levels? 2) What factors lead to greater financial 
development? Studying financial development in the Latin American region is relevant for 
two reasons. First, Latin America is a natural laboratory to study the impact and 
determinants of financial development because these countries have experienced significant 
improvements in the financial sector in the last decades. Second, previous empirical 
evidence has shown that we cannot generalize in relation to financial development and 
pursuing region specific analyses is necessary. Countries in the region share a historical, 
political and socioeconomic background, which is important to consider when studying 
financial development. 
Using panel data during the period 1961-2007 in a panel framework for 18 Latin 
American countries, the main findings in relation to the effect of financial development in 
economic growth are the following. For the full sample, financial development has a 
significant positive effect on economic growth in the long run, but a significant negative 
effect in the short run. This finding goes according to Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006) 
finding. However, when the sample is divided in two groups, this result only holds for the 
high income group. For the low income group, financial development has no significant 
effect in the long run or in the short run. In the analysis of the determinants of financial 
development, using 5 year average observations during the period 1970-2007, greater 
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financial openness and lower country risk are associated with greater financial 
development. Financial openness seems to benefit the most in those countries that are 
relatively closed. When the country risk index is disaggregated by the financial, political, 
and economic risk indices, only the political risk index has a positive significant effect on 
financial development (the higher the value of the index, the less political risk there is). 
There are only two components from the political risk index that have a significant positive 
effect on financial development, law and order and government stability.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief literature review on 
the finance-growth link and on the determinants of financial development. Sections III and 
IV describe the data and the methodology. Section V presents the results, and Section VI 
concludes.    
 
II. Literature Review 
A. The Finance-Growth Link 
While the general belief is that financial development has a positive effect on 
economic growth (supply leading hypothesis), there is theoretical and empirical work 
supporting that this effect is non-existent and that financial development is just a 
consequence of economic growth (demand following hypothesis). Financial development 
can be generally defined as increasing access to credit, and the positive effect of financial 
development on growth is derived from the effect financial development has on capital 
accumulation and productivity (Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000). With the development of 
the financial sector there is greater access to capital that results in more funding available 
for good investment opportunities. Greater access to capital leads to greater labor 
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specialization and more access to new technology (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Saint-Paul, 
1992). Consequently, improvements in capital markets lead to greater economic growth.
2
 
On the other hand, there has been some skepticism about the benefits derived from 
financial development. There are three main reasons to be skeptical about the impact of 
financial development on economic growth. First, there is research that supports the 
demand following hypothesis, where financial development is just a consequence of 
economic growth (Shan, 2005). Second, the impact of financial development on economic 
growth seems to be dependent on certain conditions. There is empirical evidence showing 
that the effect of financial development on growth is different across regions and among 
countries with different income levels, levels of financial development, and institutional set 
ups (see Aghion et al. 2005; Blanco, 2009; De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995; Rioja and 
Valev 2004a,b; Shen and Lee, 2006; among others). Third, financial development can 
produce greater macroeconomic volatility, becoming a destabilizing force in the economy 
(Loayza and Ranciere, 2006). When financial development leads to volatility, it is expected 
that financial development will have a negative effect on economic growth. According to 
Loayza and Ranciere (2006), the short run effect of financial development on economic 
growth might be reflected negative economic growth as a result of macroeconomic 
instability, and the long run effect is expected to be positive in terms of economic growth. 
Thus, looking at the impact of financial development at different time frames is necessary. 
In the Latin American context, where countries have experienced periods of 
significantly volatility, distinguishing the short and long run effect of financial 
development is of special interest to policymakers. When studying the impact of financial 
                                                            
2 Refer to Blanco (2009) and Levine (2005) for a thorough discussion of the literature on the finance-growth 
link. Odhiambo (2007) presents a good discussion on the supply leading and demand following hypotheses. 
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development on economic growth, it is also important to keep in mind that financial 
development might have a differential impact on growth depending on specific country 
conditions. Some countries will be better equipped to absorb the influx of credit. It is likely 
that specific country characteristics, in relation to their level of development (i.e. income) 
might determine a country’s ability to use the influx of credit productively. For this reason, 
studying the impact of financial development for countries with different income levels is 
relevant for the design of future policies related to financial markets in Latin America. 
 
B. The Sources of Finance 
In the review of the literature, the factors that have been considered as the main 
determinants of financial development are the degree of openness, institutions, and political 
stability. Liberalization of the goods and capital markets are associated with greater 
financial development (Baltagi et al., 2009; Chinn and Ito, 2006; Klein and Olivei, 2008). 
Openness to trade and capital flows have been proposed as important determinants of 
financial development. According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), there will be a group of 
people who will oppose to financial development due to the competition it brings. With 
trade and financial liberalization, the power of those who are opposed to financial 
development is significantly weakened. Therefore, substantial financial reforms take place 
when the power of interests groups is diminished with openness, leading to greater financial 
development. 
Financial liberalization is associated with the strengthening of the financial system 
in two ways.
3
 First, as a result of financial liberalization, the entrance of foreign banks into 
                                                            
3 Refer to Chinn and Ito (2006) and Klein and Olivei (2008) for a comprehensive literature review of the 
channels through which financial liberalization leads to greater financial development.  
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the domestic financial sector leads to an increase in available loanable funds and efficiency. 
Efficiency in the financial sector increases significantly with financial liberalization since 
there is greater competition and greater pressure to reform the financial sector. Second, 
Klein and Olivei (2008) argue that a virtuous cycle of greater savings and efficiency is 
created with increasing capital account openness because financial intermediaries are able 
to achieve economies of scale. 
Furthermore, institutions seem to play a key role explaining the differences in 
financial development across countries.
4
 According to Chinn and Ito (2006), there are two 
different categories of institutions that have been considered as important determinants of 
financial development: 1) Institutions that affect the economy as a whole, and 2) 
Institutions that affect the financial sector. In the first group, the relevant institutions are 
related to bureaucratic quality, law and order, and control of corruption, among others. 
Because these institutional factors directly affect the way of doing business and relate to 
perceptions on the stability of the legal system, it is expected that they are associated with 
greater levels of financial development.  
The second group of institutions includes those institutions that specifically affect 
the financial sector. According to Djankov et al. (2007), institutions that increase the power 
of creditors and the access to lending information are crucial for financial development. 
When creditor rights are enforced, credit is likely to expand because creditors feel more 
protected against default. Creditors are also more likely to lend when they are able to get 
more information about potential lenders. Greater financial depth is expected when there is 
                                                            
4 Beck and Levine (2005) present an excellent review of the literature on the relationship between institutions 
and financial development. 
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an increase in the access to information on lenders and protection to private credit 
institutions.  
Furthermore, the stability of a specific country might significantly affect capital 
markets. The degree to which there is stability in a country affects investors’ perceptions, 
and consequently their willingness to invest in that country. According to Roe and Siegel 
(2009), a country's capacity to protect investors is related to political stability. Thus, 
countries with unstable political systems offer low protection to investors.  
Empirical evidence on the importance of openness and institutions as factors 
explaining financial development is abundant. Herger’s et al. (2008) cross-sectional 
analysis shows that trade openness has a significant effect on financial development. In a 
panel framework that includes only less developed countries, Baltagi et al. (2009) find that 
trade and financial openness explain financial development. They interact trade and 
financial openness, and find that this interaction term is negative. They conclude that while 
financial development requires both types of openness, relatively closed economies benefit 
the most from opening up to trade or capital. Chinn and Ito (2006) find that at certain 
institutional threshold, financial liberalization has a positive effect on financial 
development. Results from Klein’s and Olivei (2008) are along the lines of Chinn’s and Ito 
(2006) findings.  Klein and Olivei (2008) find that institutions drive the positive effect of 
financial liberalization on financial development, where developed countries that have 
better institutions get greater benefits from financial liberalization. The openness to trade 
and capital flows experienced during the process of globalization is likely to be associated 
with institutional reforms that significantly affect capital markets (Mishkin, 2009). 
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There is also empirical evidence on the impact of institutions and political stability 
on financial development. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) provide evidence that institutions 
that affect all sectors of the economy have a significant direct effect on financial 
development. They show empirically that property rights and contracting institutions are 
important determinants of financial development. Beck et al. (2003) also find that 
institutions, either shaped by legal origins or initial endowments, have a significant effect 
on financial development in a sample of 70 former colonies. Andrianova et al. (2008) also 
find evidence that institutions related to governance have a significant effect on financial 
development, where lower quality of institutions are associated with greater government 
ownership in the financial sector. In relation to institutions that affect capital markets, 
Djankov et al. (2007) present strong empirical evidence that creditor rights and access to 
lending information are important determinants of financial development. Additionally, 
Roe and Siegel (2009) present empirical evidence showing that political instability explains 
financial backwardness.  
 While there are several papers on the determinants of financial development, few 
have taken a regional approach. When studying the factors that lead to greater financial 
depth is important to focus on regions that share historical, political, and socio-economic 
backgrounds. It cannot be expected that the same factors that explain financial development 
in a specific country in Asia or Africa should explain capital markets in Latin America. By 
taking a regional approach to the study of the sources of finance, more specific policy 
recommendations could be provided. 
III. Data 
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The data used in this analysis is divided in two parts. For the first part, which 
focuses on determining the impact of financial development on economic growth in the 
short and long run, yearly observations between 1961 and 2007 are used.  For the second 
part, which focuses on studying the determinants of financial development in Latin 
America, five year average observations between 1970 and 2007 are used. The 18 Latin 
American countries included in both parts of the analysis are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Countries were selected in the basis of data availability over a long period of 
time. 
This analysis uses the indicator of financial development most commonly used in 
previous work, private credit as a share of GDP.
5
 This indicator comes mainly from Beck’s, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) data on financial structure updated in 2010. From this 
dataset, a large number of observations were missing for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, 
and Uruguay. Thus, private credit as a share of GDP was estimated for those countries 
following Beck’s, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) methodology and using data from 
the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010).
6
  
                                                            
5 This analysis emphasizes on financial development in relation to the banking sector. While studying the 
impact of equity markets on growth and its determinants for the Latin American region is relevant, consistent 
data across the region for a large period of time is not available. Furthermore, financial markets in Latin 
America are more based on the banking sector, which makes the focus on private credit as an indicator of 
financial development a good approach. 
6 Constructed data on financial development indicators in Latin America is available upon request. 
Correlation between the constructed data and the available observations in Beck’s, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine (2000) dataset is always around 0.99, which confirms the use of the appropriate methodology. For 
Colombia, some missing observations were filled in with linear interpolation. 
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Data on real GDP per capita, population, government spending as a share of GDP, 
and trade openness is obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2009).
7
 Data on 
financial openness is obtained from Chinn and Ito (2008), and data on inflation is obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2010). Data on banking crisis was obtained 
from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Data on country risk 
is obtained from the Political Risk Services Group (2010). Other data used to construct a 
measure of trade openness that is exogenous in the growth equation comes from United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNCOMTRADE, 2010) and Mayer and 
Zignago (2006). Table 1 includes a description of the variables used in this analysis and 
their sources. Tables 2 and 3 show the summary statistics for both parts of the analysis.     
 
IV. Methodology 
A.  Impact of Financial Development on Economic Growth  
When studying the impact of financial development on economic growth in the 
short and long run for Latin America, this analysis follows Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006) 
methodology closely. Loayza and Ranciere (2006) propose using the Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999).
8
 For the PMG estimator, an 
autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL(p,q,q,…,q)) dynamic panel specification is applied. 
A vector error correction model (VECM) is considered under this specification, where the 
short run dynamics of the variables in the system are influenced by the deviation from 
equilibrium. The ARDL(p,q,q,…,q) used for the PMG estimator is specified as follows 
                                                            
7 Real GDP per capita is estimated extrapolating 1996 values in international dollars, which make this 
indicator comparable across countries. 
8 Refer to Loayza and Ranciere (2006) for an explanation of the appropriateness of the PMG estimator when 
disentangling the finance-growth link and a description of this methodology. Refer also to Blackburne and 
Frank (2007) for a description of the PMG estimator and how it is estimated in Stata. 
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yit ij yi,t j
j 1
p
ij
'
j 0
q
i,t j i it       (1) 
Where yit represents the dependent variable for t = 1, 2,…, T time periods, and i =  
1, 2, …, N groups. Xi,t-j is the k x 1 vector of explanatory variables (regressors) for group i, 
ij are k x 1 coefficient vectors, ij are scalars, i represents the fixed effect, and εit the time 
varying disturbance. Equation 1 can be reparametrized in the following way and time series 
observations for each group are stacked 
yi iyi, 1 i i ij
* yi, j
j 1
p 1
i, j ij
*
j 1
q 1
i i              (2) 
Where yi is a t x 1 vector of the observations of the dependent variable of the ith 
group, Xi is a t x k matrix of the regressors that vary across groups and time periods,  is a   
t x1 vector of 1s. One of the main requirements of this model specification is the existence 
of a long run relationship between yit and Xit, where the error-correcting speed of 
adjustment term for the long run relationship represented by i must be significantly 
negative (and no lower than -2). The long run relationship between yit and Xit for each 
group is expressed as follows 
yit ( i
' / i) it it        (3) 
Where  is a stationary process. For the long run homogeneity assumption, the 
coefficients on Xi are the same across groups. Long run coefficients of Xi are expressed as 
i = - i/ i, where i = . In the PMG estimator, while the long run coefficients are equal 
across groups, the intercept, short run coefficients, and error variances differ across 
countries.
9
 
                                                            
9 Please refer to Blackburne and Frank (2007) for a good explanation of the specification of PMG model. 
Asteriou and Hall (2007) also provide a brief discussion of the PMG estimator. 
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For the PMG estimation in this analysis, real GDP growth (first difference of the 
natural log of real GDP per capita) is the dependent variable and financial development 
(private credit in natural logs) is in the right hand side of the equation. Initial GDP per 
capita (natural log), government size (natural log), trade, and inflation are included as 
control variables.
10
 A dynamic specification of the form ARDL(3,3,1,1,1,1) is used, and all 
variables are time-demeaned.
11
 All independent variables are entered in levels for the long 
run relationships and in first difference for the short run relationships. The ARDL form 
specified above includes the first and second lag of the first difference of real GDP and 
private credit as regressors. Annual observations between 1961 and 2007 are used for this 
part of the analysis. Because of the lag structure of the model, estimations will include 
observations between 1964 and 2007 (44 observations per country).  
 
B. The Determinants of Financial Development 
The approach taken to find out what factors explain financial development in Latin 
America in this analysis is similar to the one used by Baltagi et al. (2009). The dynamic 
panel General Method of Moments (GMM) suggested by Arellano and Bond (AB, 1991) is 
implemented and an ARDL(p, q,q,…,q)  specification is considered for the AB estimator. 
For the AB estimator, the first lag of the dependent variable is included in the right hand 
side of the equation, which leads to endogeneity issues since the lag of the dependent 
variable is determined by the error term. This endogeneity problem biases the estimates 
provided by the general GMM.   Arellano and Bond (1991) propose differencing the data to 
                                                            
10 These variables are constructed following Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006) approach; refer to Table 1 for a 
description of how these variables were constructed. 
11 Lag lengths selected based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions. The number of lags is 
selected in a way where the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for the regression is minimized. This process 
is done for each panel.  
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address for the endogeneity of the right hand side variables and for specific country 
characteristics. The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM uses lagged levels of the dependent 
variable as instruments to address for the endogeneity of the dependent variable. The model 
specification of the AB estimator can be expressed as 
yit yi,t 1 it i it         (4) 
Equation 4, which represents first difference transformation and removes the 
constant term and the individual effects, shows that the lag of the dependent variable is 
included as regressor and Xit is the  tN x k matrix of the explanatory variables. For this 
estimation, the instruments used are the available lags of the levels of the endogeneous 
variables. 
Arellano’s and Bond (1991) methodology is appropriate for datasets with many 
panels and few periods. For this reason, and to smooth out short run fluctuations in the data, 
five year average observations are considered in this part of the analysis. Five year average 
observations are constructed using available observation between 1970 and 2007. Financial 
development growth (the first difference of private credit as a share of GDP in natural log) 
is used as dependent variable, and its first lag enters in the right hand side of the equation. 
The real GDP per capita growth (first difference of real GDP per capita in natural log) and 
a dummy for banking crisis are entered as control variables.
12
 The variables of interest that 
enter in the right hand side of the equation are trade openness (natural log), financial 
openness, the interaction between trade and financial openness, and the country risk 
                                                            
12 Time dummies were not included since they are not significant in most of the estimations, and their 
inclusion leads to estimates that violate the assumption that idiosyncratic errors are independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d). Note that private credit and real GDP are entered in first difference initially as 
we are interested on considering the relationship between the growth rates of these variables. 
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index.
13
 The country risk index is a composite indicator of political, financial, and 
economic risk indices. Thus, the model will be estimated by including the components of 
the country risk index.
14
 Several indicators related to institutions and country stability 
compose the political risk index, and the model will be estimated including these indicators 
one at the time. Due to data unavailability, the time period is reduced when the institutional 
and political stability variables are included. In the model specification shown in Equation 
4, it is observed that the first difference is taken from all variables to transform the equation 
into the difference GMM. The lagged levels of financial development growth are used to 
form GMM-type instruments. 
 
V. Results 
A. Impact of Financial Development on Economic Growth  
Table 4 presents the estimates obtained when using the PMG estimator to determine 
the short and long run effect of financial development on economic growth for the full 
sample. The first two columns show the coefficients and the standard errors for the full 
sample. In this estimation, the long run coefficients of all control variables but inflation are 
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients for initial GDP per capita and 
government size are different than what was expected, but trade and inflation have the 
expected signs. For the short run estimates, all control variables, but trade, are statistically 
                                                            
13 This analysis focuses on testing empirically the effect of financial openness on financial development, 
which relates to the liberalization of the capital account. Financial liberalization is defined by Ranciere et al 
(2008) as the deregulation of the domestic financial markets, in addition to the liberalization of the capital 
account. Financial openness and financial liberalization terms are used interchangeable by several in the 
literature, but it is important to make the distinction when doing empirical analyses. For example, Abiad and 
Mody (2005) and Abiad et al. (2008) construct an index of financial liberalization that focus on financial 
reform and present an analysis of the factors explaining it. Chinn’s and Ito (2008) financial openness index, 
which is used in this analysis, relates only to liberalization of the capital account. 
14 Refer to Table 1 for a description of how is the country risk index constructed and its components. 
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significant. Only the coefficient sign for initial GDP per capita is unexpected. The first lag 
of the dependent variable is positive and statistically significant. Financial development has 
a positive significant effect at the 1 percent level on economic growth in the long run. For 
the short run, financial development has a negative effect, where only its first difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The first difference of the second lag of 
financial development has a negative effect, but it is marginally significant (significant at 
10 percent level). The positive and negative effect in the long and short run respectively, 
goes according to Loayza’s and Ranciere (2006) finding.  
Following Blanco’s (2009) approach, this analysis also evaluates the possibility that 
the effect of financial development is different across different income groups. Based on 
countries’ real GDP per capita in the middle of the sample period (in year 1985), the 
sample is divided in high and low income countries. The countries included in the high 
income group are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The countries included in the low income group are 
Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Paraguay, and Peru. In Table 4, columns 3 and 4 present the coefficients and standard 
errors for the high income group, and columns 5 and 6 show estimates for the low income 
group. For the high income group the signs and significance of most coefficients stay the 
same. Financial development shows a significant positive effect in the long run at the 1 
percent level, but a marginally significant negative effect in the short run (10 percent level). 
For the low income group, the significance and sign of the coefficients changes 
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dramatically. In this estimation, financial development shows no significant effect on 
economic growth in the short or in the long run.
15
  
 
B. Determinants of Financial Development 
 Estimates of the model of the determinants of financial development in Latin 
America are shown in Tables 5 and 6. In Table 5, the first two columns show the 
coefficients and standard errors for the baseline model that does not include variables 
related to institutions or stability. In this estimation, real GDP growth has a positive 
significant effect at the 1 percent level, which was expected. Banking crisis also has a 
positive significant effect, which was unexpected. A reason why this coefficient might be 
positive is that this indicator might capture the period of time where restructuring of the 
financial sector takes place. Trade openness has a negative sign and it is not statistically 
significant, which was unexpected. Financial openness and the interaction term between 
financial and trade openness are significant at the 1 percent level. While the coefficient for 
financial openness has a positive sign, its interactive term with trade openness is negative. 
This finding goes according to Baltagi et al. (2009). The negative coefficient of the 
interaction term implies that the effect of capital openness on financial development will be 
larger for relatively closed economies than for relatively open economies. 
                                                            
15 A Hausman test was performed to ensure that the PMG estimates are preferred to the ones obtained from 
the Mean Group (MG) estimator.  The MG estimator fits the model separately for each group. The Hausman 
test provides evidence that PMG estimates are preferred since we fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
difference in coefficients is not systematic for the full sample. The test statistic for the parameters (joint test) 
is equal to 7.06, with a probability of 0.22. Thus, the homogeneity restriction is not rejected jointly for all 
parameters. Furthermore, the condition for the error-correction speed of adjustment is meet in all the 
estimations, where i is statistically significant with a negative value greater than -2. Estimations were also 
performed without Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago since it could be argued that these 2 countries do not share 
the common characteristics of the rest of the sample. Results are the same when these countries are excluded. 
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 From the estimates shown in Table 5, we can observe that the lag of the dependent 
variable is not statistically significant. This can lead us into questioning whether the 
dynamic model panel approach, where the lagged dependent variable is included as a 
regressor, is the adequate model. A lag length test provides evidence that one lag of the 
financial development growth indicator is the adequate number of lags.
16
  
 In Table 5, Model 2 (columns 3 and 4) shows the estimates obtained when a 
composite index of country risk is included. This country risk index has a significant 
positive effect on financial development at the 5 percent level. Thus, as country risk 
decreases (index increases) financial development increases. Model 3 (columns 5 and 6) 
presents the estimates obtained when the components of the country risk index (economic, 
financial and political risk indices) are included. These estimates show that only the 
political risk index has a positive significant effect on financial development. This finding 
suggests that a decrease on political risk (increase in the index) is beneficial for finance.  
The model specified in Equation 4 is estimated with the 12 components of the 
political risk index, where they are entered into the model one at the time to avoid 
multicolinerarity issues.
17
 The components of the political risk index are closely related to 
institutions and country stability. The indicators that account for institutions that affect the 
economy as a whole and that are included in the political risk index are: corruption, law and 
order, and bureaucratic quality. Investment profile index seems to be the indicator that 
accounts for institutions that directly affect the financial sector since it is composed by 
indicators related to contract viability, expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment 
delays. It is expected that there is a close relationship between the investment profile index 
                                                            
16 Lag length selected using the ADF regressions, where the regression that minimizes the AIC is chosen (in a 
panel set up). 
17 See Table 1 for a description of the components of the political risk index. 
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and our financial development indicator since investment profile will be related to 
investment risk and consequently to the willingness to invest in a specific country. Thus, 
there is an important feedback between these two indicators, and it is hoped that the AB 
estimator allows for estimating the independent effect of financial sector institutions on 
financial development. Other indicators related to country stability that compose the 
political risk index are government stability, internal and external conflict, religious and 
ethnic tensions, and democratic accountability. 
Four components came out statistically significant when the model is estimated by 
including each component of the political risk index one at the time, and the estimates are 
shown in Table 6.
18
 Law and order and government stability have a positive significant 
effect on financial development at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Investment 
profile and internal conflict have a marginally significant effect on financial development 
(10 percent level).
19
 From these estimations we can conclude that from the different 
indicators that relate to institutions, law and order is the one that is relevant for the 
development of the financial sector. Additionally, when looking at different indicators that 
relate to country stability, government stability is the one that matters the most for financial 
development. 
In this analysis it is important to note that trade openness has a negative effect and it 
is insignificant in most cases (it is significant only at the 10 percent level in two out of six 
cases). In relation to openness, financial openness seems to be the key player in explaining 
                                                            
18 Estimates are shown only for those estimations in which the component of the political risk index is 
significant. Other estimations that include the other components of the political risk index, one at the time, are 
not included for purpose of space but are available upon request. 
19 Note that in all the estimations the Sargan test shows that the instruments used are valid since we fail to 
reject the hypothesis that the overindentifying restrictions are valid. The serial correlation tests also show that 
the idiosyncratic errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) as required for the AB estimation. 
In all AB estimations but one, we meet the conditions of rejecting first order autocorrelation and failing to 
reject second order autocorrelation at the 5 percent level.   
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financial development in Latin America. A possible explanation of this finding is the 
sample period used. This analysis includes the period of 1990-2007 in most cases, which is 
a period where financial markets experienced opened up siginificalty. In fact, the standard 
deviation for the index of financial openness is more than double the standard deviation of 
the trade openness indicator.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
In the analysis of the impact of financial development on economic growth, there 
are two main findings. First, there seems to be evidence that financial development has a 
positive effect in the long run, but a negative effect in the short run for the Latin American 
region. This finding is relevant as it might relate to the financial crises experienced in the 
Latin American region in the last couple of decades. This analysis provides evidence that 
financial development might bring some instability that leads to lower economic growth in 
the short run. Nonetheless, financial development seems to be associated with positive 
economic growth in the long run, which should be considered when designing policies that 
promote economic growth in Latin America.  
Second, the estimation results obtained when the sample is separated by income 
groups corroborate previous findings related to the fact that the effect of financial 
development is dependent on certain conditions. This fact must also be taken into 
consideration when policies that aim to promote economic growth through developing the 
financial sector in the Latin American region are designed. Promoting the deepening of 
financial markets seems to be beneficial for high income groups, but not for low income 
groups. Therefore, financial reform should be a priority for those countries with relatively 
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higher income levels in Latin America, but not for all.  For further research, disentangling 
what conditions allow the relatively high income group to reap benefits from financial 
development in the long run is necessary. Perhaps preconditions related to institutions or 
certain financial development threshold might be relevant. 
From the study of the determinants of financial development in Latin America, the 
main findings can be summarized as follows. Financial openness seems to be playing a key 
role on the development of financial markets in Latin America, where it has a robust 
positive significant effect of great magnitude. The analysis here provides evidence showing 
that financial openness will benefit the most, in terms of improving financial markets, those 
countries that are relatively closed. Thus, those countries with trade restrictions will find 
that liberalizing capital accounts can lead to significant expansions of credit.  
This analysis shows that country risk, in relation to political risk, is also an 
important source of finance in the region. In specific, law and order and government 
stability seem to be important factors that affect financial development the most in Latin 
American countries. From this finding, we can conclude that policies that focus on 
promoting government stability and strengthening the legal system and its observance are 
relevant for improving financial markets in the region. This is an important finding for 
Latin America since the region has become relatively stable in the last decades. Therefore, 
by ensuring the strengthening of democracies and promoting stability, financial markets 
might be able to deepen in the future. Furthermore, ensuring that the legal system is strong 
and impartial and citizens observe the law, would lead to the improvement of capital 
markets. For further research, it will be interesting to evaluate whether there is a 
relationship between financial openness and institutions. Furthermore, this analysis uses an 
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indicator of financial openness that relates to capital account openness. Future research 
should consider a wider indicator of financial liberalization that accounts not only for the 
openness of the capital account, but also for financial reforms and deregulation of the 
domestic financial market.   
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 Table 1. Variable description and source 
 
Variable description and source 
Financial 
development 
Private credit as a share of GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine  (2000) and Author’s construction using International Financial 
Statistics (IMF, 2010). 
 GDP per capita Real GDP per capita, Laspeyres constant prices. Source: Heston et al. 
(2009).  
Initial GDP per 
capita 
Initial GDP in the five year period divided by population in the actual year, 
(time variant, different every year). Constructed using total population and 
real GDP, Laspeyres constant prices. Source: Heston et al. (2009). 
Government size Government spending as a share of GDP (from real GDP Laspeyres 
constant prices). Source: Heston et al. (2009).  
Inflation Inflation plus 100 (in natural log). Source: Author’s construction using 
International Financial Statistics data (IMF, 2010). 
Trade  Residual of a regression of the natural log of trade openness (export plus 
imports divided by GDP, from real GDP Laspeyres constant prices) on the 
natural log of the area of the country, natural log of population, landlocked 
dummy, net oil exporter dummy, and time dummies. Source: Author’s 
construction using data from Heston et al. (2009) for the trade openness 
indicator and population, from Mayer and Zignago (2006) for area of a 
country and landlocked dummy, and from UNCOMTRADE (2010) for the 
construction of the net exporter oil dummy (this estimation assumes oil 
dummy equals to zero for missing observations).  
Banking crisis Banking crisis dummy equal to 1 if a country experienced a financial crisis 
in that year. Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008) for initial years and 
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) for duration of crisis.  
Trade openness Exports plus imports as a share of GDP (from real GDP Laspeyres constant 
prices). Source: Heston et al. (2009). 
Financial openness Index of capital account openness. Source: Chinn and Ito (2008). 
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 Table 1. Variable description and source (continued)*  
 Variable description and source 
Country risk Composite index of country risk. Index composed by financial, economic 
and political risk indices. The political risk rating contributes 50% of the 
composite rating, while the financial and economic risk ratings each 
contribute 25%.  
Political risk Composed by the following 12 components: government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external 
conflict, corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, and bureaucracy quality.  
Financial risk Composed by the following 5 components: foreign debt as a percentage of 
GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and 
services, current account as a percentage of exports of goods and service, 
net international liquidity as months of import cover, and exchange rate 
stability.  
Economic risk Composed by the following 5 components: GDP per head, real GDP 
growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance as a percentage, current 
account as a percentage of GDP.  
Law and order The law component refers to the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system, and the order component relates to the assessment of popular 
observance of the law.  
Government stability This indicator relates to the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs and its ability to stay in office. This indicator is composed by 
government unity, legislative strength and popular support.  
Investment profile This indicator relates to the risks to investment, where it is composed by 
contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays.  
Internal conflict Indicator related to internal political violence and its actual or potential 
impact on governance. It is composed by civil war/coup threat, 
terrorism/Political violence, and civil disorder.  
*The source for variables in this section is the Political Risk Group (2010). 
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Table 2. Impact of Financial Development on Growth Data – Summary Statistics 
Annual observation, 1961-2007, 18 countries (statistics on time demeaned data) 
  Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ln(GDP per capita) 846 1.10E-10 0.516 -1.608 1.188 
ln(Finc Dev) 846 7.19E-10 0.569 -1.969 1.315 
ln(Initial GDP per cap) 846 2.60E-10 0.513 -1.591 1.125 
ln(Government Size) 846 3.54E-11 0.337 -1.191 0.691 
Trade 846 -1.27E-10 0.449 -1.396 1.229 
Inflation 846 2.22E-10 0.359 -0.651 4.167 
      
 
Table 3. Determinants of Financial Development Data - Summary Statistics 
5 year average observations, 1970-2007, 18 countries 
  Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ln(Finc dev) 144 -1.555 0.565 -3.212 -0.155 
ln(GDP per capita) 144 8.698 0.541 7.330 10.075 
ln(Trade openness) 144 3.953 0.608 2.561 5.283 
Banking crisis 144 0.108 0.230 0.000 1.000 
Financial openness 144 0.320 1.452 -1.812 2.532 
Trade open*Finc open 144 1.597 5.998 -7.429 13.375 
Country risk 90 62.901 10.515 34.600 81.981 
Financial risk 90 32.722 7.541 11.883 45.986 
Political risk 90 60.239 11.454 28.383 81.167 
Economic risk 90 32.745 4.783 15.817 44.486 
Law and order 90 2.796 1.021 1.000 5.000 
Government stability 90 6.999 1.732 2.283 9.681 
Investment profile 90 6.764 2.228 1.167 11.500 
Internal conflict 90 8.020 2.256 0.350 11.139 
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 Table 4. Impact of financial development on economic growth (Pooled Mean Group Estimator) 
 All countries  High income countries  Low income countries  
Variables Coeff   Std.Error   Coeff   Std.Error   Coeff   Std.Error   
             
Long Run Coefficients             
Financial Development 0.075 *** 0.018  0.090 *** 0.018  -0.081   0.062  
Initial GDP per capita 0.522 *** 0.110  0.495 *** 0.112  0.122   0.280  
Government Size 0.295 *** 0.076  0.272 *** 0.070  0.206 * 0.122  
Trade 0.280 *** 0.060  0.317 *** 0.061  0.254 *** 0.092  
Inflation -0.059   0.038  -0.007   0.031  -0.349 *** 0.132  
             
Error-Correction Coefficient -  -0.094 *** 0.034  -0.138 ** 0.071  -0.079 ** 0.036  
             
Short-Run Coefficients             
d(GDP per capita)t-1 0.151 *** 0.054  0.193 ** 0.081  0.110 * 0.067  
d(GDP per capita)t-2 -0.013   0.040  0.054   0.044  -0.061   0.066  
d(Financial development)t -0.040 ** 0.020  -0.059 * 0.034  -0.014   0.018  
d(Financial development)t-1 0.003   0.014  -0.005   0.021  0.010   0.020  
d(Financial development)t-2 -0.022 * 0.013  -0.030 * 0.018  -0.017   0.018  
d(Initial GDP per capita)t 0.080 ** 0.037  0.109 * 0.059  0.063   0.051  
d(Government size)t -0.207 *** 0.038  -0.256 *** 0.068  -0.162 *** 0.032  
d(Trade)t 0.021   0.028  0.013   0.042  0.025   0.039  
d(Inflation)t -0.058 *** 0.016  -0.057 ** 0.024  -0.051 ** 0.023  
Intercept 0.002   0.010  0.029 ** 0.014  -0.040   0.028  
             
No. Countries 18    9    9    
No. Observations 792    396    396    
Log Likelihood 1778.832       891.985       894.196       
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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 Table 5. Sources of financial development (Arellano and Bond Estimator) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Variables Coeff   Std.Err   Coeff   Std.Err   Coeff   Std.Error   
             
d(Financial development growth)t-1 0.097   0.112  0.063  0.131  0.055  0.144  
d(GDP per capita growth)t 0.749 *** 0.293  0.271  0.621  0.568  0.671  
d(Banking crisis)t 0.554 *** 0.206  0.366 ** 0.184  0.325 * 0.192  
d(Trade openness)t -0.217   0.250  -0.606 * 0.352  -0.460  0.341  
d(Financial openness)t 1.390 *** 0.455  1.152 *** 0.421  1.271 *** 0.450  
d(Trade Open)t* d(Finc Open)t -0.323 *** 0.106  -0.273 *** 0.096  -0.301 *** 0.101  
d(Country risk)t     0.022 ** 0.009     
d(Financial risk)t         0.006  0.010  
d(Political risk)t         0.017 *** 0.006  
d(Economic risk)t         -0.012  0.022  
            
No. Countries 18    18    18   
No. Observations 90    72    72   
No. of time periods 5    4    4   
Sample period 85-07    90-07    90-07   
            
Sargan Test (p-value) 21.163  (0.10)  14.946  (0.31)  14.029 (0.37)  
First order serial correl test (p-value) -2.206  (0.03)  -2.291  (0.02)  -2.233 (0.03)  
Sec. order serial correl test (p-value)  -1.784   (0.07)   -1.125   (0.26)   -1.203  (0.23)   
Robust standard errors provided. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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 Table 6. Sources of financial development (Arellano and Bond Estimator) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Variables Coeff   Std.Err   Coeff   Std.Err   Coeff   Std.Err   Coeff   Std.Err   
                 
d(Financial development growth)t-1 0.047   0.142  0.006  0.139  0.012  0.139  0.051  0.148  
d(GDP per capita growth)t 0.788   0.494  0.593  0.427  0.816 * 0.461  0.790  0.514  
d(Banking crisis)t 0.320 * 0.191  0.364 * 0.190  0.415 ** 0.185  0.338 * 0.202  
d(Trade openness)t -0.464   0.328  -0.590 * 0.341  -0.448  0.359  -0.408  0.362  
d(Financial openness)t 1.220 *** 0.395  1.465 *** 0.375  1.447 *** 0.412  1.328 *** 0.433  
d(Trade Open)t* d(Finc Open)t -0.277 *** 0.090  -0.347 *** 0.088  -0.340 *** 0.096  -0.309 *** 0.098  
d(Law and order)t 0.145 ** 0.066           
d(Government stability)t    0.098 *** 0.033        
d(Investment profile)t        0.048 * 0.029     
d(Internal conflict)t            0.045 * 0.026  
               
No. countries 18   18    18    18   
No. observations 72   72    72    72    
No. of time periods 4   4    4    4    
Sample period 90-07   90-07    90-07    90-07    
                
Sargan Test (p-value) 16.019 (0.25)  18.441  (0.14)  16.628  (0.22)  17.389  (0.18)  
First order serial correl test (p-value) -2.13 (0.03)  -1.87  (0.06)  -2.21  (0.03)  -2.17  (0.03)  
Sec. order serial correl test (p-value)  -1.50  (0.13)   -1.27   (0.20)   -1.41   (0.16)   -1.58   (0.11)   
Robust standard errors provided. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
